



Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Economics

Course Reading

Industrial organisation and business strategies

Valid from 08/28/2023

Course Code: NEGB24

Course Title: Industrial organisation and business strategies

Credits: 7.5

Degree Level: Undergraduate level

Books

Besanko, D., Dranove, D., Shanley, M., Schaefer, S. (2010). *Economics of strategy*. John Wiley & Sons (Chap. 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15)

Luis M.B. Cabral (2000). *Introduction to Industrial Organization*. MIT Press (Chap. 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15)

Reference material

Coase, R. H. (1972). Durability and Monopoly. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 15(1) (, 143-149.)

Cooper, Thomas E (1986). Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion. *RAND Journal of Economics*, 17(3), p. 377-88.

Farrell, Joseph; Shapiro, Carl (1985). Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis. *American Economic Review*, 75(1), , p. 219-27

Green, Edward J; Porter, Robert H (1984).). Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information. *Econometrica*,, 52(1), , p. 87-100.

Huric Larsen, J.F (2015). Cournot Oligopoly with N-Incumbents, M-Entrants, Homogeneous Goods and Asymmetric Costs. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2552508>.

Huric Larsen, J.F (2014). Strategies and evaluating strategic choices of firms and consumers. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507656>.

Huric Larsen, J.F, Münch, A (2016). Competition Policy and Environmental Policy. *Journal of Industry Competition and Trade*, 16(2), , p. 137-153.

Huric Larsen, J.F. (2014). A note on the effect of consumer protection requirements on firm strategy. Electronic copy available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2506269>.

Huric Larsen, J.F. (2014). The Collusion Incentive Constraint. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2506269>.

Klaus M. Schmidt, K.M (1997).). Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition. 64(2), (191-213)

Klemperer, P (1987). Markets with Consumer Switching Costs. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 102(2), , p. 375-394

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Leibenstein, H (1966). Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency" Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency.". *The American Economic Review*, 56(3), p. 392-415.

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Lieberman, R.B (1987). Strategies for capacity expansion. *Sloan Management Review*, , Summer 1987, p. 19-25

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Mueller, D.C (1997). The persistence of profits above the norm. *Economica*, 44, p. 369-380

Pindyck, R.S (1979). The Cartelization of World Commodity Markets. *American Economic Review*, 69(2) (419-33.)

Posner, R., (1975). The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation. *Journal of Political Economy*.

Salant, Stephen W; Switzer, Sheldon; Reynolds, Robert J (1982). Reputation and Imperfect Information. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 27(2), , p. 253-79

Slade, M.E (1989).). Price wars in price-setting supergames. *Economica*, 56(223), , p. 295-310

Slade, M.E (1990).). Strategic Models and Interpretation of Price-War Data. *European Economic Review*,, 34(2-3, p. 524-37

Stigler, G (1964). A Theory of Oligopoly. *Journal of Political Economy*, , 72(1), p. 44-61

Suslow, V.Y (2005). Cartel contract duration: empirical evidence from Inter-War international cartels. *Industrial and Corporate Change*, 14(5, p. 705-44